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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of environmental monitoring is to quantify the levels of radioactivity in 
the various compartments of the environment disregarding its origin: natural or 
anthropogenic, under routine or accidental conditions, in view of assessing the health effects 
on man and his environment. However, because of their historical background, which is 
connected to the development of nuclear industry, the monitoring programmes established 
in the European countries focus on artificial radioactivity.  
Man-made radioactive matter can get into the biosphere by means of legally permitted 
discharges from nuclear installations or infrastructures where radioactive material is being 
used, e.g. hospitals and industry, or as the result of an accident. For each cause, specific 
sampling and monitoring programmes, as well as systems for internationally exchanging 
their results, have been implemented in the European Union and are still evolving.  
Routine monitoring is done on a continuous basis throughout the country by sampling the 
main environmental compartments which lead to man; typically these are airborne 
particulates, surface water, drinking water and food (typically milk and the main constituents 
of the national diet). The aim of routine monitoring is then also to confirm that levels are 
within the maximum permitted levels for the whole population (Basic Safety Standards, (EC, 
1996)) and to detect eventual trends in concentrations over time. A comprehensive overview of 
the sampling strategies and principal measurement methods in the countries of the EU will be 
given, as well as how this information is communicated to the general public. 
In case of an accident, monitoring (i.e., sampling, measuring and reporting) is tailored to the 
nature of the radioactive matter released and to the way in which it is dispersed. In particular 
during the early phase of an accident with atmospheric release it is essential to be able to 
delineate the contamination as soon as possible to allow for immediate and appropriate 
countermeasures. Afterwards, once the radioactivity has deposited, it is important to have 
detailed information of the deposition pattern; a detailed deposition map at a fairly early stage 
will serve to steer medium and long term countermeasure strategies (e.g. agricultural, 
remediation). A summary of the most commonly used techniques, as well as a discussion of 
the various sampling network types (emergency preparedness, mobile) will be given. 
The Chernobyl NPP accident on 26 April 1986 also triggered the European Commission to 
develop, together with the EU Member States, systems for the rapid exchange of 
information in case of a nuclear/radiological accident (European Community Urgent 
Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE), European Radiological Data Exchange 
Platform (EURDEP)). Also these systems will be further described. 
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2. Types of monitoring networks 
Depending on the risk, networks have been developed for various purposes. In the first 
place there is the monitoring of radioactivity releases at nuclear installations, which aims at 
verifying the authorised discharges. In addition, in most European countries an 
environmental monitoring programme is operated for the main compartments of the 
biosphere, i.e., air, water, soil, foodstuffs. The purpose of such an environmental 
radioactivity monitoring programme is to verify compliance with the basic safety standards 
for the public. 
However, this objective is influenced by the source of radioactivity as well as the 
environmental compartment(s) affected. Radioactive material mainly comes into the 
environment by means of discharges into the atmosphere and/or the water. These 
discharges can happen in a controlled or in an accidental way. Therefore a distinction 
should be made between routine and emergency situations. In general one can distinguish 
between the following types of monitoring networks: 
• surveillance monitoring networks around nuclear installations to ensure that releases to 
the atmosphere and acquatic compartment remain below authorized limits, and to 
verify potential, chronic accumulation of radioactivity in the environment. Results 
obtained in this way may be used to estimate radiation exposure to critical groups (i.e., 
members of the public who have been identified as likely to receive the highest doses) 
(Hurst & Thomas, 2004). In case of accidental release, these networks can also provide 
information about the off-site contamination close to the installation, usually by means 
of ambient dose rate or by air concentration measurements; 
• national surveillance networks that generally cover the whole territory. These 
contribute to ensuring compliance with the basic safety standards for the population at 
large. These networks are operated on a national basis and cover the whole biosphere; 
• emergency preparedness networks continuously check levels of mainly ambient dose 
equivalent rate and airborne radioactivity, in order to detect accidental releases and 
subsequently monitor the evolution of the radioactive plume. Depending on the 
country, the monitors belonging to these networks are positioned along national 
borders and/or distributed over the national territory; 
• mobile equipment: depending on the size and the type of accident (release into the air 
and/or the aquatic phase, types of radionuclides dispersed etc.), additional mobile 
equipment (terrestrial or airborne) will be needed to obtain more detailed information 
for more highly contaminated areas. 
Whereas the first two types of network mainly have been designed for routine conditions, 
the latter two types have been designed in view of accidents. Most of the information during 
the early (or release phase) of an accident will come from the emergency preparedness 
network and to a lesser extent from the national surveillance networks. 
Ideally, an emergency monitoring strategy combines routine monitoring procedures with 
special requirements set by the emergency e.g. by combining measurement results from 
fixed monitoring stations (static network) with those from mobile or intervention teams.  
During the aftermath of an accident, emergency monitoring is not only important for effective 
post accident management but also to reassure the general public. Therefore, during a nuclear 
emergency the measuring and laboratory activities, as well as the general preparedness to 
perform situation analysis, are enhanced and intensified and special measuring systems (in 
particular mobile monitoring equipment) are used when appropriate (Lahtinen, 2004). 
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3. Environmental sampling and measuring techniques 
3.1 Exposure pathways 
Atmospheric discharges may result in exposure from four pathways, leading to doses to the 
population: 
• external contamination; 
• inhalation; 
• ingestion; 
• external radiation. 
To estimate the consequences of the external contamination and inhalation pathways,  
monitoring by air sampling is performed. For the ingestion pathway this happens by of 
means of food sampling, e.g., milk, whereas external radiation is determined by direct 
measurements of external dose or by soil analysis. 
Liquid discharges may irradiate man through three pathways: 
• ingestion; 
• external contamination; 
• external radiation. 
The monitoring of dose from ingestion in this case is usually carried out through sampling 
of fish and shellfish. The other two pathways are monitored by sampling of water, aquatic 
bio-indicators (e.g., seaweed, fish, molluscs) and sediments, and by direct measurements of 
doses from handling fishing gear or residing on beaches (Aarkrog, 1996). 
Internal contamination, as a result of inhalation and/or ingestion, can also be measured 
directly by whole body counting equipment (see also section 4.4.3.1). In specific radiological 
situations, like in the case of contamination with pure alfa and beta emitting radioisotopes, 
monitoring of the internal contamination can be performed by analysis of the blood, urine 
and/or faeces. 
3.2 Air 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of monitoring airborne radioactivity in the environment is to check domestic 
and foreign facilities. Depending on the meteorological conditions, airborne radioactive 
material can be rapidly transported over long distances in any direction. Man can become 
contaminated immediately through inhalation or external contamination, or indirectly by 
deposition and transfer of the radionuclides into the food chain. Therefore, monitoring the 
air is particularly important in order that contamination be detected as early as possible. 
In general, one distinguishes two sampling and measuring techniques for air: 
• particulates (alpha/beta or nuclide specific); 
• gases (e.g., gaseous iodine, noble gases). 
Airborne particulate radioactivity concentration is difficult to measure directly, since the 
artificial activity concentrations are typically lower than the natural radioactivity 
concentrations. Therefore accumulation methods are being used. The airborne dust is collected 
by drawing air through a filter material, which can be made of paper, glass fibre or 
polypropylene. The sampling devices may be located in diverse environments (in an open 
field or a courtyard, at ground level or on the roof of a building), which however 
complicates the intercomparability of measurements and their representativeness. Natural 
radionuclides include radon and its short-lived decay products (typically 1 - 20 Bq⋅m-3 in 
outdoor air), 7Be and 40K.  
Depending on the response time of the measurement systems, one should make a 
distinction between on-line and off-line sampling/measuring devices. 
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3.2.2 On-line measurements 
Based on the nuclide category to be measured, generally two measuring methods are 
considered: 
Alpha/beta measurements:  
Large area proportional counter tubes are used to measure the accumulated activity. Fixed 
filter devices only permit sampling periods of maximum one week and require thus 
considerable operational service. Automated filter changing mechanisms allow automatic 
operation up to six months and are particularly used in automatic monitoring networks; 
their drawback, however, is that they require regular maintenance. It is common practice for 
monitors to have flow rates of up to 25 m3⋅h-1, and detect artificial alpha and beta activity 
concentrations down to 0.1 Bq⋅m-3 in less than one hour in a natural background of several 
Bq⋅m-3. By increasing the filter speed (in case of a ribbon filter) or by increasing the 
frequency of the filter exchange, one is able to measure up to 106 Bq⋅m-3 (Frenzel, 1993). 
 
 
Fig. 1. On-line (left) and off-line (right) aerosol monitoring networks in a number of 
European countries (Bossew, P. et al, 2008) 
Widely used measuring methods are: 
• gross alpha: i.e., total alpha minus natural alpha radioactivity. The measurement is 
made by gas flow proportional counters, with or without anti-coincidence. Lower 
detection limits range between 1x10-5 and 4x10-2 Bq⋅m-3; 
• gross beta: i.e., total beta radioactivity with correction for natural radioactivity (mostly 
influenced by radon daughters). The measuring instruments used are: Geiger-Müller, gas 
flow proportional counter with different active surfaces and plastic scintillators with ZnS 
coating for simultaneous coincidence of alpha contamination. Depending on the methods 
www.intechopen.com
 
Monitoring Radioactivity in the Environment Under Routine and Emergency Conditions 
 
149 
used, the lower detection limits range between 5x10-5 and 1 Bq⋅m-3. Distinction between 
natural and artificial radioactivity can be done very effectively by simultaneous 
coincidence counting of alpha decay and by assuming that there is no contribution of 
artificial alpha emitters. In this way concentrations of artificial radioactivity down to  
0.1 Bq⋅m-3 can be detected. One may also perform a second, delayed beta-counting after, 
e.g., 12 h (most short-lived daughters, except 212Po, will then have decayed). This is a valid 
procedure for routine monitoring, but in emergency situations the alarm level will still be 
determined by the natural background (on the order of 10 Bq m-3) (Janssens et al, 1991). 
Nuclide specific (gamma) measurements:  
The filter is measured by solid state detectors: 
• semi-conductor detectors (lithium drifted (GeLi) or high purity (HPGe) germanium 
detector); Measuring systems in inaccessible locations, such as high mountains or 
remote islands, become independent from the liquid nitrogen by using electrically 
cooled Ge detectors; 
• or scintillation counters (NaI). 
Nowadays nuclide-specific identifications are increasingly performed by means of high 
purity Ge detectors. To ensure optimum early warning, these instruments are designed to 
allow simultaneous alpha-beta measurement and nuclide-specific measurement. In the 
automatic mode, modern instruments are capable of reaching low detection limits  
(50 mBq⋅m-3 for 60Co in 1 h) and can analyse spectra for up to 100 different nuclides. Mostly 
137Cs and 60Co and some natural nuclides such as 7Be are measured. 
3.2.3 Off-line measurements 
Artificial airborne radioactivity in the range of µBq⋅m-3 cannot be detected by automatic 
instruments in ‘real-time’, since the natural radioactivity level is too high. Most institutes 
perform correction from natural radioactivity by waiting 2 to 5 days before measuring the 
filter, to allow for short-lived radon/thoron daughters to decay.  
Typically, high-volume air samplers (HVAS) with air flow rates ranging from 100 to  
1,000 m3⋅h-1 collect airborne particulates during one week. In case of an emergency, the 
sampling frequency can be increased to daily. By means of gamma spectroscopy detection 
levels of a few µBq⋅m-3 or less can be obtained (e.g., 137Cs concentrations on the order of  
0.1 µBq⋅m-3 can be measured in a 3x105 m3 filter sample). Chemical treatment of certain filters 
afterwards allows the analysis of pure alpha or beta emitters (e.g., 239Pu and 90Sr) (Frenzel, 1993). 
3.2.4 Measuring gaseous components 
Iodine is selectively accumulated in the thyroid gland and retains special attention because 
of its potential health hazard. Iodine in air can be bound to aerosols or can be gaseous, each 
requiring special measuring techniques. When bound to aerosols, iodine is measured with 
techniques as described previously. 
Gaseous iodine is sampled by means of special filters (e.g., silver impregnated activated 
carbon). The active carbon adsorbs and thus accumulates the gaseous iodine. The drawback of 
these filters is that, depending on the airborne iodine concentration, they become saturated 
and have to be replaced. This method may also be used for collecting noble gases (e.g., 85Kr). 
The active carbon cartridge surrounds the detector or is located directly next to it. The specific 
peak of 364 keV of 131I is usually measured with scintillation (NaI) detectors. Although HPGe 
detectors are used for measuring the contribution of different iodine radioisotopes, nowadays 
131I concentrations in the order of hundreds of mBq⋅m-3 can be measured in 1 hour. 
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3.3 Surface water 
Surface water includes river, lake or sea water. It is one of the environmental compartments to 
which radioactive effluents from nuclear installations can be directly discharged. Some of the 
sampling methods are automatic and continuous and are designed to detect contamination of 
water purification stations by radioactive effluents from industrial and research laboratories, 
hospitals having a nuclear medicine, etc... (e.g., the Telehydroray system installed on French 
rivers, and the Belgian automatic monitoring system on the river Meuse (Debauche, 2004). 
These automatic devices are designed to perform total gamma counting and to measure 
concentrations of 131I, 99mTc and 137Cs with detection limits in the order of 1 Bq⋅l-1. 
The time and frequency of sampling is very important for rivers with large differences in 
seasonal hydrological variations. In all cases, additional information on the river flow rate is 
very important. Radionuclides can be found in the water phase and associated with 
suspended particles, becoming eventually incorporated into sediments and living species. 
Natural radionuclides in surface water include 3H (0.02 - 0.1 Bq⋅l-1), 40K (0.04 - 2 Bq⋅l-1) 
radium, radon and their short-lived decay products (< 0.4 – 2 Bq⋅l-1). 
For routine conditions, river water samples can be taken continuously (or daily) and are 
then bulked into monthly or quarterly analysis. Alternatively spot samples are taken 
periodically and analysed individually. 
Some laboratories (e.g., in France) filter their surface water prior to measurement. 
Measurement is then performed on the filtered water and the suspended material 
separately. More elaborate chemical separations are needed for 90Sr, whereas 3H, which is 
also produced by nuclear industry, is measured after multiple distillation or electrolytic 
enrichment of the sample. Usually, residual beta (total beta less 40K activity) contamination 
is reported (De Cort et al., 2009), although there is a clear tendency in many countries to 
perform nuclide-specific measurements. 
With the exception of tritium in rivers with nuclear industry, usually the levels of 
radionuclide contamination in surface water are below the detection limit, due to the 
diluting factor. Hence countries nowadays make more use of biological indicators (aquatic 
moss, molluscs, vegetation) as these organisms have the capacity to concentrate specific 
chemical (stable and radioactive) elements. Fish is also frequently sampled, being a better 
activity integrator in the longer term (Sombré & Lambotte, 2004). 
3.4 Soil/sediments/deposits 
Airborne particulates are removed from the atmosphere by gravitational settling and turbulent 
transfer to ground surfaces (dry deposition) or by incorporation in or scavenging by rain 
droplets (wet deposition). The latter is the predominant process in European countries, and 
monitoring networks do not generally measure the two components separately.  
Depending on the circumstances and the objectives of the measurement, deposition can be 
sampled and measured in many different ways:  
• for routine measurements, the radioactivity is mostly accumulated on artificial 
collection surfaces, with active surface areas ranging from 0.05 to 10 m2. The materials 
used for the collecting areas vary (stainless steel, plastic, polyester, PVC). In most cases 
these are designed for collecting precipitation. Some detectors distinguish between wet 
and dry deposition (they open and close appropriately in response to rainfall), but most 
sample total (wet + dry) deposition. The rainwater may be directly fed to a bottle or to 
an ion exchange column where the nuclides are fixed. Measuring the activity in the 
collected rainwater and the amount of rainfall allows calculating the average total 
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deposition during the sampling period. Between the different European countries 
sampling periods range from daily, over weekly to monthly (De Cort et al., 2009); 
• in case of emergency with large transboundary release to the atmosphere, vast areas can 
be contaminated. Once the radioactive material has deposited, it is important that, in 
order to determine appropriate countermeasures in the immediate post-accident 
management period and to reassure the public, rapid and reliable monitoring of 
contaminated areas is performed. Airborne gamma ray spectrometry is a fast and effective 
means to monitor large areas for deposited radioactivity. It is performed by solid-state 
detectors (usually by means of high volume scintillation detectors (NaI), high purity 
germanium detectors or a combination of both) mounted on an aeroplane or helicopter 
that flies at constant speed and low altitude (typically 50-100 m). Along the flight track, 
time-integrated gamma ray spectra (typically 1 s) are recorded which, along with the 
information obtained from on-line GPS and radar-altimetry for automatic position and 
height correction, allow terrestrial radioactivity levels to be quantified and mapped. One 
of the main sources of uncertainty arises from the uncertainty in the activity depth 
distribution in the soil. Most commonly nowadays calibration is done by comparison with 
ground based spectrometry on representative radiation fields. Beyond its obvious benefits 
in case of a large nuclear accident, airborne gamma ray spectrometry is also applied for 
geological mapping for mineral exploration, soil mapping for agriculture, pollution 
studies and lost sources. (Dickson, 2004) 
• core sampling is a conventional technique and together with high resolution spectrometry 
it can be highly accurate and sensitive. It is the only method for radioisotopes which do 
not emit gamma rays (eg. 90Sr). It serves as an indicator of long-term build-up of 
radioactivity in the environment and is therefore essential for studies of vertical profiling 
and measurements by alpha, beta or mass spectrometry. It has the drawback of being 
time-consuming. Migration in the soil depends on the chemical form of the radionuclide, 
the soil type, hydrology and agricultural practices. Most artificial radionuclides are found 
in the upper 30 cm soil layer. Because of the possibility of large micro-scale variations in 
deposition, it is important to take a sufficient amount of soil samples in order to obtain a 
reasonable estimate of the deposition of radioisotopes at a given site. Subsequently the 
samples are thoroughly mixed in order to obtain a representative aliquot which can then 
be further analysed and measured (Aarkrog, 1996); 
• in-situ measurements, where a gamma spectrometer is placed at 1m above the ground, 
properly shielded by lead to measure in solid angle and thus reducing ambient gamma 
radiation (Raes, 1989). In-situ gamma-spectrometry measurement of the mean surface 
radioactivity concentration for a large area (~1 ha) in a relatively short time (generally 15-
30 minutes for a deposition of 10 kBq m-2 of 137Cs) (Dubois & Bossew, 2003). The 
uncertainty of the measurement is influenced by local topographic variations (buildings, 
trees,…), by vegetation cover and by the vertical activity distribution of the radionuclide. 
Good results have been obtained by means of an advanced analysis of the measured 
gamma spectrum, referred to as ‘Peak-to-valley’ method (Gering et al., 1998; Tyler, 2004). 
In-situ measurements are also common practice in emergency preparedness networks 
where gamma dose-rate detectors (usually Geiger-Müller probes, proportional counters, 
ionisation chambers) monitor continuously the ambient gamma dose-rate. 
• herbage is also a readily available indicator of deposition and of incorporation into 
green vegetables. Furthermore herbage forms part of the milk pathway to man (Hurst & 
Thomas, 2004). 
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3.5 Food chain 
3.5.1 Drinking water 
Radioactivity in drinking water is an important indicator of radionuclide transfer from the 
environment to man. The most important natural radionuclides in water for drinking 
consumption are 3H (0.02 - 0.4 Bq l-1), 40K (typically 0.2 Bq l-1 but widely variable), radium, 
radon and their short-lived decay products (0.4 - 4 Bq l-1). 
The sampling of drinking water varies in the European countries, depending on the national 
water resources and distribution systems. Drinking water thus may be sampled from 
ground or surface water supplies, from water distribution networks, mineral waters and 
table water in bottles. After sampling, the water is mostly evaporated for direct 
measurement of the residue or is separated on ion-exchange columns. More elaborate 
chemical separations are needed for 90Sr, whereas 3H is measured by liquid scintillation after 
purification of the water sample by multiple distillations (De Cort et al., 2009). 
The European Commission has issued a directive on water quality, including radioactive 
aspects. In particular, a limit of 100 Bq l-1 of tritium and a total indicative annual dose of 0.1 
mSv (natural radioisotopes not included) from water intended for human consumption has 
been established (EC, 1998). Member States are adapting their national monitoring 
programme to meet this demand. 
3.5.2 Milk 
Milk constitutes a principal pathway for exposure to airborne effluents. In addition it is an 
important foodstuff because it is produced continuously in large quantities, and it is consumed 
as such or it forms the basis for other foodstuffs (e.g., dairy products). It is essential for 
children, and the most important fission products such as 90Sr, 131I and 137Cs are secreted in it.  
At national level, milk samples are mostly taken at dairies that cover large geographical 
areas (in order to obtain representative samples), at farms (from raw milk) or at the super 
market (from bottled milk). To complete the national programme, supplementary milk 
samples are usually collected at single farms close to nuclear installations. Generally the 
samples are taken on a monthly basis, but sometimes only over the pasture season. Usually 
the milk samples are dried before gamma spectrometric analysis. Chemical separation is 
applied for the determination of 90Sr activity and separation of the water phase with 
subsequent distillation for the separation of 3H.  
In addition, the concentrations of the stable isotopes Ca and K are determined because of the 
similarity of their metabolic behaviour with Sr and Cs, respectively. Typical values in milk 
are 1 - 2 g l-1 for Ca and 1 - 3.5 g l-1 for K (De Cort et al., 2009). 
In case of an accidental atmospheric release, only a few days after deposition occurred, 
radionuclides already reach their maximum activity concentration in the milk (eg 2-4 days 
for 131I, 4-6 days for 137Cs or 90Sr) (Mercer et al, 2002). Hence immediate monitoring is 
required. However, in the immediate aftermath of an accidental release, some information 
may be available on the source and scale of the release, but it is very unlikely that any 
measurement data on environmental materials will be available.  
Predictive models, eventually in combination with data on activity deposited in soil, are 
essential at this point to provide an initial estimate of the dispersion of the activity released. 
Estimates of the evolution of activity concentrations in milk are required in the early stages 
following an accident. These are determined by the time of the year the deposition occurred 
(greater contamination of milk in summer and autumn when cattle are grazing in the pasture 
or delayed contamination can occur when contaminated fodder has been harvested).  
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Within this time, an extended monitoring programme with intensified sampling of milk at 
affected dairies would have to be started, and subsequently samples sent to laboratories. 
Results for gamma ray emitting radionuclides (eg 131I or 137Cs) would be available within 1 
hour, whereas the determination of pure beta emitters (like 90Sr) would require several days. 
An efficient alternative has been developed by the Radiation Protection Division/Health 
Protection Agency, UK. It consists of a portable specialised NaI detector to measure 
individual milk samples at bulking depots located in the vicinity of the contaminated area. 
Information on the radionuclide composition would be required to ensure a proper 
calibration of the measuring equipment. A minimum detection limit of 100 Bq l-1 within 100 
s of counting time is achievable (Mercer et al, 2002). 
Information on the radionuclide composition of the deposited activity is a priority for a 
sampling and measurement programme. This enables the radionuclides of primary 
radiological interest to be identified and the analytical strategy to be determined. Gamma-
emitting radionuclides can be determined rapidly without destroying the sample. However, 
it is also important to determine the contributions from beta emitters like 89Sr and 90Sr. 
(Mercer et al, 2002) 
3.5.3 Foodstuffs 
Foodstuffs are measured as separate ingredients (e.g., cereals, meat, fish, vegetables and 
fruit) or as whole meals (e.g., in canteens of factories or schools). The reason for measuring 
ingredients is to complete the monitoring programme for migration of radionuclides in the 
food chain or to check contamination of the public at large through ingestion, whereas 
sampling the whole meal gives a more direct estimate of the dose received by the 
population through ingestion. For general surveillance programmes the latter is more 
representative for the ingestion dose of the population, although ingredient monitoring is 
generally applied to obtain information on the propagation of radioisotopes in the food 
chain. Ingredients are measured particularly in case of emergencies to monitor the evolution 
of radioactive contamination of specific foodstuffs. 
In some European countries (e.g., Denmark, United Kingdom and Finland), an important 
programme for monitoring fish has been established. This is needed to determine radionuclide 
transfer in the aquatic environment. Usually, fish types most commonly caught for human 
consumption are sampled. They are sorted by their origin, species and size (Saxen 1990). 
Because of differences in the composition of national diets, there is a tendency in the EU to 
sample complete meals at schools or factory canteens in order to give a representative figure 
for contamination in a mixed diet (expressed in Bq⋅d-1 per person). Knowledge of the 
contamination of the different ingredients together with the composition of the national diet 
can also lead to a representative figure for the radioactivity level in a mixed diet. 
The radioactivity levels legally permitted in foodstuff in the EU are laid down in the 
appropriate EC legislation (EC, 1989; EC, 2000a). Monitoring of foodstuff in the aftermath of 
a large scale nuclear accident will require major and specific efforts, depending on the type 
and scale of the atmospheric release. Crop monitoring programmes can be significantly 
rationalised by using results from airborne gamma spectrometry surveys of the 
contaminated area, combined with appropriate food chain models.  
In the long term it is important that specific food types continue to be monitored, in 
particular foodstuffs coming from affected areas, even when radioactivity contamination 
levels in agricultural products have returned to normal. Typical examples are semi-natural 
foodstuffs that concentrate Cs, such as mushrooms, reindeer (through lichen), wild boar and 
carnivorous lake fish (EC, 2003).  
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3.6 Ambient dose equivalent 
External radiation is measured as an instantaneous gamma dose-rate or a gamma dose 
integrated over a certain time period. It is non-nuclide specific and provides information 
covering large areas. For emergency preparedness purposes it is of specific importance as it 
can provide ‘real-time’ information about the progression of the radioactive cloud. Therefore 
all European countries already have or are establishing automatic monitoring networks for 
ambient gamma dose rate. Table 1 illustrates how the mean distance between stations ranges 
from approximately 10 km to 150 km (values for Iceland and Russia excepted because of the 
non uniform spatial distribution of the stations considered in this study). 
 
Country Area (1000 km2) No. stations Mean distance* (km) 
Albania 29 5 76 
Austria 84 346 16 
Belarus 208 22 97 
Belgium 31 192 13 
Bulgaria 111 26 65 
Cyprus 91 7 36 
Czech Republic 79 413 14 
Denmark 43 13 58 
Estonia 43 10 66 
Finland 305 263 34 
France 544 157 59 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM)
26 1 160 
Germany 357 2 067 13 
Greece 132 24 74 
Hungary 93 77 35 
Iceland 103 5 144 
Ireland 70 14 71 
Italy 301 57 73 
Latvia 65 17 62 
Lithuania 65 21 56 
Luxembourg 2.6 18 12 
Malta 316 1 18 
Netherlands 34 191 13 
Norway 324 28 108 
Poland 313 35 95 
Portugal 92 17 74 
Serbia & Montenegro 103 5 143 
Slovak Republic 49 63 28 
Slovenia 20 42 22 
Spain 505 914 23 
Sweden 411 35 108 
Switzerland 41 116 19 
United Kingdom 244 93 51 
* The mean distance is obtained by the square root of the surface of the national territory divided by the 
amount of monitors. 
Table. 1. Number of automatic gamma dose-rate monitoring stations per country (Bossew, 
P. et al, 2008) 
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Fig. 2. Gamma dose rate monitoring networks in a number of European countries (Bossew, 
P. et al, 2008) 
The detectors most frequently used are energy-compensated, gas-filled counter tubes, 
mostly Geiger-Müller (GM), ionization chambers and proportional counters. Occasionally 
scintillation detectors (NaI crystals) or even germanium spectrometers are used, in 
particular to determine the nuclide composition of the cloud by gamma spectroscopy. Some 
countries, e.g. Germany, are exploring to replace a part of their GM tubes by detectors that 
provide nuclide specific information of the ambient radiation, such as CdZnTe semi-
conductors that operate at room temperature. 
In order to cover the measuring range from natural radiation up to high dose-rate levels 
encountered during accidental releases, two counters are usually built into a detector, one 
for low-range and one for high-range measurements. Modern detectors are equipped with 
local electronics for data transfer. They may also feature data storage and perform automatic 
background correction. 
A drawback, however, is that local dose rate measurements are very sensitive, so that even 
minor variations of the natural radioactivity concentration can be detected (e.g., due to 
radon daughters during precipitation or a pressure drop – see Fig. 3.).  
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Fig. 3. Example of the effect of precipitation (lower left) on the ambient dose equivalent rate 
(middle left), due to radon daughter washout (http://eurdep.jrc.ec.europa.eu) 
Furthermore, time-integrated dosimeters (film badges and thermo-luminescent dosimeters 
(TLDs)) are used, mostly on the perimeter fence of nuclear installations in order to obtain a 
cumulative measurement of the direct gamma radiation of the plant. Results from film 
dosimeters have to be treated with care, especially for low doses. They may also be affected 
by temperature and humidity (Hurst & Thomas, 2004). 
4. Monitoring networks 
4.1 Legislative background – information exchange and access 
It is obvious that the use of radioactive and nuclear materials holds an increased risk for 
health. Therefore monitoring of environmental radioactivity is subject to strict legal 
obligations. This paragraph describes more into detail which legislation is in place and 
which measures have to be taken by the EU Member States. 
It is normal practice to monitor not only exposure of critical groups but also to review 
exposure of the population at large. Within the European Community there is an obligation 
to do so both in terms of Article 35 of the Euratom Treaty and in terms of Article 13 and 14 
of the Basic Safety Standards (EC, 1996). 
Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty deals with Health and Safety aspects of the development 
and growth of nuclear industries and in particular with the establishment of uniform safety 
standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public. Article 35 deals with 
radioactivity levels in the air, water and soil. 
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Consequently Member States have set up programmes to monitor radioactivity levels in the 
air, water and soil over their entire territory. The main responsibility for establishing an 
environmental monitoring programme lies with the Member States. Under Article 35 the 
Commission also has access right to the monitoring facilities in order to verify their 
operation and efficiency.  
The authorities shall keep the Commission informed of radioactivity levels to which the 
population is exposed, by periodically communicating data obtained with the facilities 
referred to in Article 35. The data are transmitted to the Commission in accordance with 
Article 36 of the Euratom Treaty. The Commission adopted a Recommendation to Article 36 
(2000/473/ Euratom) (EC, 2000b) which specifies in much more detail the sample type and 
corresponding nuclide measurements that should be reported on, as well as the sampling 
frequency and the way in which these data have to be submitted to the European 
Commission. The routine environmental monitoring data are transmitted by the European 
Union (EU) Member State authorities to the Radioactivity Environmental Monitoring (REM) 
data base. This database is the basis for preparing the annual reports describing the 
radioactivity levels in the EU. Both REM database and the annual reports can be consulted 
by the public (http://rem.jrc.ec.europa.eu). 
The vastness of the radioactive contamination following the Chernobyl accident also 
emphasized the need for improved international collaboration on emergency response. 
Shortly after the accident a legal framework was realised by establishing common 
international procedures for notification, data and information exchange and mutual 
assistance (i.e., the Conventions on Early Notification and Early Assistance by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, and Council Decision 87/600 of the European 
Commission); these procedures were subsequently adopted in the national legislation of the 
Member States. The official notification system of the EC is the ECURIE system, which is the 
technical implementation of Council Decision 87/600. An EU Member State that in case of a 
radiological or nuclear emergency decides to take countermeasures to protect its population 
against an increase of radioactivity must promptly notify the European Commission. Upon 
receipt and verification, the EC will immediately forward this information to all Member 
States, after which the latter are required to inform the EC at appropriate intervals about the 
measures they take and the radioactivity levels they have measured.  
EURDEP is a system by which automatic monitoring results (currently mainly ambient dose 
equivalent rate, but also air concentration data) are exchanged, irrespective of an emergency 
situation or not. Countries using EURDEP are exempted of sending the same radioactivity 
measurement results by ECURIE. 
Although it has been designed originally for Europe, there are concrete plans between the 
EC and IAEA to extend the system to a world-wide coverage. At this moment about 4400 
detectors in 35 European countries exchange continuously gamma dose rate measurements. 
The information can also be accessed by the public (see http://eurdep.jrc.ec.europa.eu) 
4.2 Routine monitoring 
The routine monitoring programme, which has been developed in parallel to nuclear 
industry, essentially aims at verifying: 
• the discharge authorisation of nuclear installations; 
• compliance with the dose limits or constraints laid down for protecting the 
population. 
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Therefore one should distinguish between national monitoring programmes and 
surveillance of nuclear installations.  
The national monitoring programme has been designed to verify compliance of the Basic 
Safety Standards. Hence the monitoring programme should aim at providing information 
on the overall dose received by the population at large. The monitoring network is therefore 
to be designed so that the results are representative on a national level. This means that 
sampling locations must be far enough from nuclear installations in order to avoid direct 
influence of discharges, that sampling must be made of all the compartments of the 
environment and that sampling intervals must be performed at time periods that allow 
verification of dose limits (EC, 1996). 
In addition there are environmental monitoring programmes for nuclear facilities in 
operation. These depend on the type of discharges, whether into the atmosphere and/or to 
the water. Verification of releases from nuclear installations is best performed by installing 
equipment in the stack and in the liquid effluent discharge line of the plant. Monitoring 
stations installed in the immediate vicinity of the plant ensure independent but indirect 
verification by the authorities. A network located at short distance and in an appropriate 
number of wind directions and downstream of the discharge point in the river or sea, 
assures this. In addition, estimation of the actual doses received by the critical groups 
requires that local foodstuffs be sampled and analysed. 
Usually, for routine conditions, radioactivity levels are below the detection levels so that 
there is a trend to make more use of bio-indicators such as lichen, aquatic mosses and algae 
to trace accumulated radioactivity (EC, 2000b). 
4.3 Emergency preparedness monitoring 
4.3.1 The need for emergency preparedness monitoring 
Any notification message about an emergency at a nuclear facility, warning that a significant 
amount of radioactivity has been released or is likely to be released, should come from the 
plant operator. This information will then be further disseminated through the proper 
communication channels on regional, national and international level (De Cort et al, 2007). 
Nevertheless many countries have set up mechanisms for early warning based on 
nationwide gamma dose-rate monitoring networks. This would allow the emergency 
situation to be identified independently and irrespective of whether the release was of 
domestic or foreign origin. 
For this purpose it is necessary to be able to identify the source and to circumscribe the 
extent of the radioactive cloud with reasonable accuracy. Identification and circumscription 
are possible only if the density of the network is sufficiently high and if data from 
neighbouring countries can be relied upon in case of a transboundary movement. 
4.3.2 Network design criteria 
The basic requirement of an emergency preparedness network is its ‘early-warning’ 
capability, by which is meant that it must be able to detect a cloud resulting from an 
accidental release. Next it must be able to delineate the extent of the cloud and to track its 
progression over a territory. 
Although they are mainly designed for the early detection of accidental releases, gamma 
dose-rate monitoring networks have limited value for circumscribing and monitoring the 
evolution of such clouds because they cannot readily discriminate between airborne and 
deposited radioactivity. Continuous aerosol monitoring devices are therefore preferred, 
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but they have the drawback of having higher maintenance costs. Also out of financial 
budgetary reasons, a limited amount of gamma spectrometers is usually incorporated  
in an on-line network to give qualitative information about the composition of the  
cloud. After the passage of the cloud, the latter in combination with the gamma  
dose-rate readings, allow for the assessment of the amount of radioactivity deposited to 
the ground. 
Gamma detectors, in view of their relatively low installation and maintenance cost and 
wider range of sensitivities, best serve the alarm function of the national monitoring 
networks. Geiger-Müller detectors, proportional counters, ionisation chambers or 
scintillation crystals may equally be preferred. The existence of so many systems has the 
drawback of differences in energy response. For the mere alarm function an accurate 
calibration (and knowledge of the nuclide composition of the cloud) is not a priority, but 
when absent, it may create problems when data from different networks are brought 
together.  
Irrespective of the topology of the network, the representativeness of the gamma dose-rate 
measurements depends on many factors, such as the presence of trees (which enhance dry 
deposition), the presence of surfaces that promote surface runoff of radioactive material 
reavenged by precipitation (e.g., paved surfaces, roofs), attenuating obstructions (e.g., vicinity 
of buildings, walls), the surface roughness and the detector position above ground (e.g., terrain 
or roof). Differences of more than one order of magnitude may occur between different sites 
which have been contaminated under the same conditions. As is shown in (Sohier, 2002), these 
differences can be characterised by environmental parameters, on which basis the measured 
data can be interpreted correctly. In addition this parameterisation could be used to improve 
harmonisation between different national networks. 
When a network is being designed, a number of general factors should be taken into 
account: 
4.3.2.1 Natural background subtraction 
Gamma detectors are also very sensitive to variations in background count rates. Apart from 
regional variations for which corrections can be made, there are also slow and fast temporal 
variations due to the dependence of radon daughter concentrations in air and soil on 
meteorological parameters (e.g., an enhanced soil exhalation in case of a pressure front 
passing by or a cyclonic pressure drop, or washout of atmospheric aerosols in case of rain). 
Automatic data processing for pattern recognition of such phenomena or correlation is 
difficult and in general one relies on the judgement of the operator in the central station for 
data collection. 
Nevertheless alarm levels can be set at dose rates on the order of 100 nSv h-1 above 
background, which is certainly low enough. 
Continuous aerosol monitors are preferable because they are not affected by ground 
deposition. However they consist of moving and consumable parts, so maintenance costs 
are higher. Continuous beta monitoring can be performed, e.g., by putting a beta detector in 
front of a slowly rotating paper ribbon. As already mentioned in section 3.2.2, there is the 
additional complication of having to subtract counts from radon daughters. 
A distinction between natural and artificial radioactivity can also be achieved by gamma ray 
spectroscopy. Knowledge of the radionuclide composition of the release is of interest for 
predicting further transport and deposition of the cloud and for assessing population doses. 
The composition is not likely to vary quickly in the course of time, so it is sufficient to 
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perform such measurements only in a few stations. Detection levels achieved by sampling 
on step-feed filters and on-line counting with a germanium detector are on the order of 0.05 
Bq m-3 (typically 2 hours measuring time). 
4.3.2.2 Sampling/counting time  
For continuous monitoring systems sampling and counting times are identical. In view of 
the alarm function of such systems one might be tempted to reduce the sampling/counting 
time at the expense of statistical error which in turn would demand an increase in alarm 
levels. This is particularly true for continuous beta detectors. In the case of gamma detectors 
it is to a large extent possible to choose a more sensitive instrument. 
Counting times should nevertheless be sufficiently short so that the network yields 
information on the speed, direction and longitudinal elongation of the cloud. On the other 
hand, counting times too short may cause the central processing unit to be overloaded with 
redundant data, i.e., the ‘pace’ of the network (average distance between the stations 
divided by the sampling time) should be comparable to the wind velocity. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Location of automatic gamma dose-rate monitoring stations that contribute to  
the EURDEP system (situation of April 2011), showing the topographic diversity of the 
national emergency preparedness networks. 
4.3.2.3 Spatial homogeneity 
The detection capacity of a network also depends on its spatial homogeneity. An elegant 
analysis of the impact of homogeneous coverage of the territory and of the limited extent of 
the network (countries’ dimensions) can be made in terms of the ‘factual’ dimension of both 
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the network and the cloud. Such an analysis demonstrates the need for integrating networks 
on the largest possible scale and for comparable network densities (Raes et al., 1991; Sohier, 
2002). Figure 4 which shows the automatic monitoring stations for gamma dose-rate that 
contribute to the EURDEP system, demonstrates the lack of spatial homogeneity between 
the national emergency preparedness networks. 
4.4 Monitoring after an accident 
4.4.1 General considerations 
Even though a thorough analysis of continuous monitoring data may improve the accuracy 
of predicting further transport and dispersion of the cloud, which may prove critical for 
timely assessing its possible impact and for preparing adequate countermeasures, additional 
means are necessary in case of a real accident. 
Early decisions such as exhorting the population to seek shelter could be based directly on 
reading of gamma detectors or aerosol monitors. Evacuation or the distribution of iodine 
tablets on the other hand might be considered either as a precautionary measure when a 
major release is expected or otherwise after the plume has passed, but only after the current 
radiological situation has been assessed. Static networks are inappropriate for this purpose 
because exposure pathways depend to a large extent on ground deposition. In the absence 
of rain and in case of a well-circumscribed cloud, calculated values for ground deposition 
may be available. However the Chernobyl accident has taught us that in case of rainfall one 
must cope with a patchy deposition pattern, which can be assessed only by portable and 
preferably mobile equipment. 
4.4.2 Monitoring strategies 
In case of a possible accidental release of radioactivity, the monitoring programme aims at 
answering the following questions: 
• has an abnormal release occurred; 
• is there an action to be taken; 
• which remedial measures should be implemented. 
As for operational monitoring the design of the programme depends on the nature of the 
environment which has received the contamination. It is, however, important in any 
emergency that the results are obtained relatively quickly, which means that rapid methods 
should be used for making measurements. This usually means a lower sensitivity and thus a 
greater risk of errors. On the other hand if the contamination is substantial, fast 
measurements are possible without losing much in sensitivity. Last but not least, at all times 
one should be aware that equipment can become contaminated, leading to incorrect 
measurements. 
4.4.3 Mobile equipment 
4.4.3.1 Terrestrial equipment 
Vans have been fitted with all equipment needed for in-situ measurement of dose rates, and 
for collecting air samples with aerosol filters and charcoal cartridges, and possibly for soil 
and biological samples, and for their immediate counting and spectrometric analysis. The 
fitting of such vans, their maintenance, the provision and permanent training of personnel 
involves considerable costs. It is a matter of choice whether resources are allocated to the 
extension of static networks or to mobile equipment. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
162 
The mobile equipment should also have adequate means of communication and data 
transmission with the co-ordination centres (GPS navigational instruments and radar 
altimeter). 
The need for environmental radioactivity measurements in case of an accident is not limited 
to rapid and detailed assessments prior to the implementation of countermeasures. Also in 
case of a remote accident involving a moderate release, it will be necessary to perform a 
large number of measurements in different media in order to perform an accurate a 
posteriori assessment of its radiological impact. Such an assessment fulfils the need for 
adequately informing the public and may also serve scientific investigations. 
These kinds of measurements may be pursued over longer periods of time. The assessment 
of the impact of short-lived nuclides such as iodine and ruthenium isotopes will be possible 
only if measurements are performed within a few weeks after the accident. 
The direct monitoring of internal contamination of people is usually done by means of 
whole body counters (WBC). The monitoring infrastructure is usually of a stationary type 
and installed at nuclear power plants, fuel cycle plants, research centres, hospitals with 
nuclear medicine, etc... However certain countries, such as France, also dispose of mobile 
equipment, usually in the form of intervention trailers, for monitoring contaminated 
persons. This equipment consists of vehicles equipped with ‘partially body counters’ (e.g., 
thyroid, thorax) and some even with WBC capacity (including appropriate shielding to 
reduce the background radiation). Detection limits (e.g. 500 Bq 137Cs for 10 minutes and 100 
Bq for 30 minutes counting time) are higher than those for fixed installations; however they 
allow inspectors to sort people according to their internal contamination. In order to make 
full use of these resources in case of emergency, the main problem is to have available 
enough personnel sufficiently trained to guarantee that this infrastructure is full used 
(Fiedler & Voigt, n.d.). 
4.4.3.2 Airborne equipment 
During the release phase, given the limitations of ground-based monitoring equipment for 
three-dimensional circumscription of the cloud, aircraft may prove very useful to carry out an 
aerial mapping at higher altitudes, in particular above the mixing boundary layer (e.g., 1500 m).  
As soon as the release has ceased, airborne gamma ray spectrometry allows for rapid 
monitoring of vast areas contaminated by radioactivity. The technique has been described in 
section 3.4. Since the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, many European countries 
have become capable of deploying measurement teams within hours of an accident being 
notified, in order to measure levels and pattern of deposited radioactive material. In view of 
combining national efforts in case of a large scale nuclear accident, European teams have 
been collaborating and exercising on various occasions over the past years. This capacity to 
act jointly and produce, in real-time, a composite map of an area in Southern Scotland has 
been demonstrated in the ECCOMAGS project (Sanderson et al, 2004). 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Competent Authorities of the European Union Member States have to ensure that the 
exposure of their population is compliant with the Basic Safety Standards (EC, 1996). To 
reach this objective European countries have set up environmental monitoring programmes 
which provide continuously the basic information, i.e., the radioactivity levels in the various 
compartments of their environment. Subsequently the doses received by the population can 
be assessed by means of radioecological models. The latter thus play an important role in 
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designing sound environmental monitoring programmes, including the definition of 
potentially important pathways and critical groups by determining the most representative 
sample types and sample locations (Vandecasteele, 2004). Also in the case of radiological or 
nuclear emergency, and based on the available monitoring and modelling information, 
Member States are required to submit emergency procedures and practices in accordance 
with the Basic Safety Standards. At this moment, the latter is being revised to allow for the 
new ICRP Recommendations (Publication 103) as well as to consolidate all EU radiation 
protection legislation in a single BSS Directive (Janssens, 2009). 
Since the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, European countries continue to enhance 
their capacity and infrastructure to monitor radioactivity in their environment. They also 
continue to improve their capacity to transfer and handle the monitoring data in real time, 
combining them with radioecological models and/or decision support systems, in order to 
convert them into information based on which decisions may be made.  
In case of an emergency with radioactive release to the atmosphere, during the release phase 
most of the information about the environmental contamination will come from the ‘static 
networks’, i.e., the emergency preparedness network and the routine monitoring networks, 
as these operate permanently. Such monitoring data, together with information about the 
release and appropriate models to forecast the atmospheric dispersion of the cloud, will be 
used by the authorities to decide on early countermeasures. However, atmospheric 
dispersion models can give rise to uncertainties in model results, which may lead to 
different approaches for early countermeasures on the national level. In order to harmonise 
the information coming from various countries and to work out a reconciled and 
comprehensive European long range atmospheric dispersion ensemble forecast, the 
ENSEMBLE system has been developed (http://ensemble.jrc.ec.europa.eu) by the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre. (Galmarini et al, 2008).   
Once the release has stopped and the radioactive material is deposited, it is important to 
know, as soon as possible, the detailed deposition pattern of the affected areas. Airborne 
and in-situ gamma spectrometry is currently considered the most efficient way to do this. 
Combining such results with appropriate food chain models can significantly rationalise 
milk and crop monitoring programmes. 
The vastness of the radioactive contamination following the Chernobyl accident also 
emphasized the need for improved international collaboration on emergency response. 
Shortly after the accident both the EC and the IAEA realised a legal framework for 
notification, data and information exchange and mutual assistance. This need to exchange 
monitoring data on international level raised questions regarding the representativeness of 
measurements coming from the various national monitoring networks. The current national 
monitoring networks are mainly based on historical, political and budgetary constraints. It 
is most unlikely that these will be converted into a unified operational European monitoring 
network. Hence the only practical and sustainable approach for the future is to harmonise to 
the maximum extent possible the data and information produced by these networks as far 
as they are to be exchanged on an international level. This means that we have to 
understand fully how monitoring is performed in the various European states. International 
intercomparison exercises only provide a part of the answer, as they mainly focus on the 
measurement aspect of monitoring, and usually do not address issues such as sampling and 
reporting techniques, including representativeness. Notwithstanding this, it is worthwhile 
to mention that a number of initiatives have already been taken to address this problem, in 
particular for measurements which are usually performed during the release phase or the 
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early post-release phase (i.e., the environmental parameterisation of gamma dose-rate 
detectors and the European collaboration of airborne gamma-ray spectrometry teams). 
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interested in learning about nuclear power.
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